Here's how the SCOTUS put it - We conclude that States may disqualify persons holding or attempting to hold state office. But States have no power under the Constitution to enforce Section 3 with respect to federal of- fices, especially the Presidency.
And after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, States used this authority to disqualify state officers in accordance with state statutes. Such power over governance, however, does not extend to federal officeholders and candidates.
States lack even the lesser powers to issue writs of mandamus against federal officials or to grant habeas cor- pus relief to persons in federal custody.
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment, on its face, does not affirmatively delegate such a power to the States. The terms of the Amendment speak only to enforcement by Congress, which enjoys power to enforce the Amendment through legislation pursuant to Section 5. his can hardly come as a surprise, given that the substantive provisions of the Amendment “embody significant limitations on state authority.
It would be incongruous to read this particular Amendment as granting the States the power—silently no less—to disqualify a candidate for federal office.
Sates have no power . . . to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner con- trol, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress
Responsibility for enforcing Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates rests with Congress and not the States.
Federalism principles embedded in that constitutional structure decide this case. States cannot use their control over the ballot to “undermine the National Government.
To allow Colorado to take a presidential candidate off the ballot under Section 3 would imperil the Framers’ vision of “a Federal Government directly responsible to the people.
The men who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, however, had witnessed an “insurrection [and] rebellion” to defend slavery. They wanted to ensure that those who had participated in that insurrection, and in possible future insurrections, could not return to prominent roles.
All nine Members of the Court agree with that result. Our colleagues writing separately further agree with many of the reasons this opinion provides for reaching it. See post, Part I (joint opinion of SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ.); see also post, p. 1 (opinion of BARRETT, J.). So far as we can tell, they object only to our taking into ac- count the distinctive way Section 3 works and the fact that Section 5 vests in Congress the power to enforce it. These are not the only reasons the States lack power to enforce this particular constitutional provision with respect to fed- eral offices. But they are important ones, and it is the com- bination of all the reasons set forth in this opinion—not, as some of our colleagues would have it, just one particular ra- tionale—that resolves this case.
